The two different terms are employed to signify the same reality, as both terms refer to God. In Ibn ‘Arabi’s ontology, this single reality is called “Existence” and for Spinoza it is “Substance”. Ibn ‘Arabi often employs the terminology of theologians to describe the nature and attributes of God, and supports his views by quoting from the Qur’an, whereas Spinoza minimises the use of theological terms and does not refer to a religious text for reinforcing his arguments.įrom the outset it is necessary to understand that for both thinkers there is a single ontological reality upon which everything stands.
By contrast, Spinoza is a rationalist thinker, relying on “reason” for knowing Reality and using the geometrical method in his Ethics for justifying his ideas. Henry Corbin also confirms Ibn ‘Arabi’s encounter with Ibn Rushd and cites him saying that “such a thing was possible, but never met anyone who had actually experienced it” (Corbin, 1981: p. When Ibn Rushd, a Peripatetic Muslim philosopher, met Ibn ‘Arabi and was told about his spiritual experience, Ibn Rushd commented on Ibn ‘Arabi’s spiritual experience saying that “this is a state that we had confirmed rationally, but we had never seen anyone who possessed it” (Chittick, 1989: p. Accordingly, Ibn ‘Arabi does not express his ideas in discursive rationalistic arguments. For him, it is the “Heart” and not “Reason” that produces true knowledge about God and the heart alone is capable of accessing the divine realm (Ibn ‘Arabi, 1980: p. Unlike Spinoza, Ibn ‘Arabi, is a mystic-philosopher and he relies on intuitive knowledge to comprehend Reality.
This exploration will be tempered with an awareness of the differences concerning their methodology, epistemology and adherence to religious texts. Regarding this ontological account of the nature of Reality, I will explore the affinity between particular aspects of Ibn ‘Arabi’s and Spinoza’s views on God’s relationship with the world. When the singular nature of Reality is asserted, the materiality of the world cannot be seen to be distinct from it.
I argue however that in the ontological systems of these two thinkers the world is neither identical to God nor different. Some scholars and critics refer to Ibn ‘Arabi and Spinoza as pantheist philosophers who identify God with the world, failing to draw any distinction between the two.
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